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GODINEZ v. MORAN
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In the early morning of August 2, 1984, during the course of a
robbery, defendant Richard Allan Moran shot and killed a bartender and
a patron of a Carson City, Nevada tavern. Nine days later, he killed his
former wife in her apartment by shooting her five times, and then
attempted suicide unsuccessfully. Moran confessed to the killings from
his hospital bed on August 13. After Moran pleaded not guilty to three
counts of capital murder, the trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation
of the defendant to determine whether he was competent to stand trial.
While the examining physicians determined that Moran suffered from
deep depression, both concluded that he was competent.
In November 1984, not wishing to mount a defense or put forth any
mitigating evidence, Moran appeared in court seeking to dismiss the
public defender assigned to his case, and to change his pleas to guilty. In
an attempt to assure that the defendant could validly waive his right to
counsel, the judge inquired into whether the defendant was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. Although Moran replied that he was
currently on medication,t the trial judge made no further inquiry with
regard to his mental state.
After asking the defendant a series of questions in an attempt to
make sure that Moran understood his legal rights, the judge determined
that he was competent to stand trial and that he had voluntarily waived
his right to counsel. After the trial judge accepted Moran's guilty pleas,
Moran was sentenced to death by a three judge panel 2 for each of the
murders. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
sentencing panel with respect to the murders of the bartender and the
patron, but reversed his death sentence for the murder of his wife.
3
On July 30, 1987, the defendant filed a state habeas petition arguing
that he had been mentally incompetent to represent himself. The trial
court, the Nevada Supreme Court,4 and the U.S. Supreme Court5 denied
relief. Defendant then filed a federal habeas petition which was denied
by the District Court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that
due process required the court to hold a hearing evaluating Moran's
competency at the time he sought to dismiss counsel and change his plea,
because "[c]ompetency to waive constitutional rights requires a higher
level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial." 6 The Ninth
Circuit noted that while a defendant need only have a "rational and
factual understanding" of his surroundings in order to stand trial, he must
be able to make "reasoned choice[s]" in order to waive counsel, and
therefore a different standard of competency should apply in Moran's
case than was applied by the trial judge.7
1 At the time, Moran was simultaneously taking four different
prescription drugs: phenobarbital, dilantin, inderal, and vistaril. The
various side effects which these drugs have been known to cause include:
confusion, light-headedness, mental depression, hallucinations, disori-
entation, short-term memory loss, drowsiness, tremors, and convulsions.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2692-93 & n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
2 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.558 (1991).
3 Moran v. State, 734 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1987).
4 Moran v. Warden, 810 P.2d 335 (Nev. 1989).
5 Moran v. Warden, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
HOLDING
Resolving a conflict among the circuit courts, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that there is no
distinction between the standard of competency to stand trial and the
standard of competency for pleading guilty or waiving the right to
counsel. 8 The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit had misconstrued
its opinion in Westbrook v. Arizona,9 and held that while states may
choose to adopt a higherstandard of competency fordefendants wishing
to plead guilty or waive the right to counsel, the Due Process Clause does
not require states to do so. 10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The holding in Moran demonstrates that occasionally a defendant
may obtain more relief from an appellate court than he sought, and such
a result may ultimately prove detrimental. Before the Ninth Circuit,
Moran had argued that the trial court should have held an additional
hearing on competency in light of evidence, arising between the time of
the competency evaluation and the hearing when Moran discharged
counsel and pleaded guilty, that he was profoundly depressed and under
the influence of a number of prescription drugs at the time he decided to
waive counsel and plead guilty.11 Defense counsel relied on the Court's
holding in Westbrook v. Arizona. 12 In Westbrook, the Supreme Court
vacated the lower court judgment because although the trial court had
determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial, the court had
failed to inquire into competency to waive counsel. Applying Westbrook,
defense counsel argued that because the Court deemed competency to
stand trial and competency to waive counsel as different, a separate
competency hearing beyond the initial competency-to-stand-trial deter-
mination should have been made in Moran's case. The Ninth Circuit
arguably went further, holding that the clear implication of Westbrook is
that due process requires a higher standard of competency to waive a
constitutional right than the competency standard required simply to
stand trial. Although Moran persuaded the Ninth Circuit, he was unable
to convince the United States Supreme Court that it should promulgate
a new constitutional rule based on the two paragraphper curiam opinion
in Westbrook.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit compelled the Supreme Court to
recast the issue in such a way that the defendant's substantive arguments
were distorted. The majority failed even to mention the fact that Moran
was under the influence of drugs at the time of his hearing. Perhaps, if
6 Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992).
7 Id. at 266-67.
8 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680,2686 (1993).
9 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam).
10 Moran, 113 S. Ct. at 2688.
11 The defendant did not argue that a higher standard should apply
at the hearing, but rather maintained throughout the appellate process
that "[d]ue process does not require a higher standard, it requires a
separate inquiry."
12 384 U.S. 150 (1966)(per curiam).
Page 8 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1
the Ninth Circuit had held that the trial court made an insufficient inquiry
into the defendant's mental state at the time of his waiver, the Supreme
Court would not have felt compelled to treat the issue as a question of
whether a different and higher standard is applicable for pleas of guilty
and waving counsel compared with competency to stand trial.
On the primary issue as the Court framed it, the major point of
contention between the majority and the dissenters centered around the
difference between, on one hand, competency to make decisions, such
as waiving counsel and pleading guilty, and on the other hand, compe-
tence or ability to perform certain acts, such as ability to assist in the
defense or to proceed without assistance of counsel. The position of the
majority was that a defendant who was found competent to make the
decision to waive counsel is necessarily competent to proceed without
counsel, and therefore a higherstandard of competence was unnecessary.
Although a defendant most likely will be better represented by counsel,
his ability to represent himself "has no bearing upon his competence to
choose self-representation."
13
The dissent believed that competence to act does not necessarily
flow from competence to choose, and therefore a separate competency
inquiry was called for in Moran's case. 14 The majority, by contrast,
believed that any heightened scrutiny in a case such as this should focus
on whether his waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary, and not on
the competency to act.
The key to deciphering the Moran decision is to understand the
different perspectives of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, and
perhaps arrive at a middle ground. At the center of an evaluation of a
defendant's competency to stand trial is her capacity to understand and
appreciate the proceeding against her, and to participate in those pro-
ceedings. The decisions to discharge counsel and to plead guilty, by
contrast, require the defendant to actually exercise the capacity referred
to in the competency-to-stand-trial hearing by waiving a number of
constitutional rights.
It is possible, and not uncommon, that a competent defendant may
knowingly exercise that competence and intelligently waive counsel and
plead guilty. Basic competence, however, remains anecessary predicate
to knowing and intelligent waiver, and a separate inquiry should be
conducted if the continuing validity of an earlier competency determina-
tion is called into question by interim events. In Moran's case, due to the
administration of a combination of highly potent presciption drugs, his
mental functions were substantially impacted, and a reevaluation of his
competence should have been conducted by the trial judge. This
additional evaluation, and not a higher substantive standard, was all
defendant argued that due process required.
It is the change in Moran's capacity which occurred in the interim
period which was the key to his defense, but which was distorted by the
debate between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit held that the different considerations involved in the evaluation
of a defendant's ability to waive rights required a quantitatively higher
standard for competency. The Supreme Court rejected this assertion
finding that a different standard was not necessary, because defendants'
rights are protected by the "knowing and voluntary" inquiry. Neither
court grasped that the heart of Moran's case was not that he deserved a
different type of competency hearing based on a higher standard, but
13 Moran, 113 S. Ct. at 2687 (emphasis in original).
14 Id. at 2694 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15 See Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), and case
summary of Medina, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 9 (1992);
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S.
961 (1956). See also Va. Code Ann. §19.2-167 (1990).
16 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
17 Id. See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
simply that he deserved a new hearing based on his changed circum-
stances during the interim period.
Ultimately, as long as defense counsel clearly distinguishes the
issues of competency and waiver, the holding in Moran is of little
significance to the Virginia defense bar. The case does outline the two
pronged constitutional inquiry which will be made in competency cases,
however. A reviewing court will first consider the issue of competency.
A fundamental principle of due process is that an incompetent defendant
may not stand trial. 15 In Dusky v. United States,16 the Supreme Court
held that the standard for competence to stand trial was "whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."
17
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly named a standard
for competence to waive constitutional rights, other courts have settled
on the Dusky standard as the appropriate standard in that context as
well.18 The Moran decision arose out of a split in the circuits, led
primarily by the Ninth Circuit, that a guilty plea required a higher
standard of competence than the standard for standing trial. 19 Moran has
settled this controversy in favor of a single standard of competency.
Competency standards in Virginia are dictated by statute. Virginia
Code section 19.2-169.1 requires that the court order a competency
evaluation if there is probable cause that the defendant "lacks substantial
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his
attorney in his own defense ....- 20 The first duty of capital defense
counsel in a case where competency may be an issue is to move for a
competency hearing under Virginia Code section 19.2-169.1. Should
defendant be found competent to stand trial, counsel should then pursue
psychiatric evaluation of the defendant for the purpose of mitigating
evidence at the penalty stage, if necessary. Expert psychiatric testimony
during the trial phase of a capital trial may or may not be helpful, and the
value of such testimony must be weighed on a case-by-case basis.
Virginia habeas practioners should be aware that the trial judge has
an independent duty, when the issue is suggested by the circumstances
or by the evidence, to make the competency determination whether or not
defense counsel moves for such a determination. Therefore, the defense
of incompetency cannot be waived by the defendant or defaulted by her
counsel's failure to move for a competency determination.
21
Once the court has established competence, in cases where the
defendant pleads guilty, it will inquire into whether the defendant's
decision to waive her constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary.
According to the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. Zerbst,
22
waiver of constitutional rights must be "intelligent and competent."
Furthermore, the Court held in Boykin v. Alabama,2 3 that the waiver of
rights (1) against self-incrimination, (2) to trial by jury, and (3) to
confront one's accusers, must be affirmatively on the record. Under
Boykin, a trial judge may not accept a guilty plea "without an affirmative
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary" on the record.24 While
the decision on competency rests ultimately with the court, the trialjudge
will most likely receive expert assistance as well as input from defense
counsel and the Commonwealth's attorney. By contrast, whether or not
the defendant's rights under Boykin are protected depends almost en-
18 See, e.g., Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 314 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
19 See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973).
20 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1(A) (1990).
21 Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967).
22 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
23 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
24 Id. at 242.
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tirely on how the trial judge conducts the determination of whether the
defendant's waiver is valid. In Moran's case, a more thorough examina-
tion most probably would have uncovered the extenuating circumstances
surrounding Moran's guilty plea and waiver of counsel.
Virginia rule of criminal procedure 3A:8, which essentially mirrors
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, codifies the Boykin require-
ments. 25 Form 6, included in the Virginia rules, ensures that a thorough
record of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the guilty plea is on
the record. That form includes twenty-four detailed (suggested) ques-
tions to be asked by the judge to an accused who pleads guilty. Assuming
that the defendant is alert and fully understands the judge's inquiries, the
form questions should protect the defendant's rights under Boykin.
26
Defense counsel representing an individual like Moran, impaired
by drugs or by mental illness, have special responsibilities. The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility states: "Any mental or physical
condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered
judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his
lawyer ..."27 Counsel in such a criminal case assumes the role of a
25 "A circuit court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea." Virginia rule of criminal procedure 3A:8(b).
26 The Supreme Court of Virginia held a defendant's guilty plea
under Boykin invalid in Gardner v. Warden of the Virginia State
Penitentiaiy, 222 Va. 491,281 S.E.2d 876(1981). In that case, defendant
agreed to plead guilty to murder in return for a sentence of thirty years
imprisonment and a five year suspended sentence. He was told to
respond negatively should the judge ask if his plea was based on a deal
with the Commonwealth's attorney. Not having been previously con-
sulted, the trial judge accepted the guilty plea and sentenced defendant
to sixty years with ten years suspended. The supreme court reversed the
trial court holding that it was clear that under the circumstances that the
guilty plea by the defendant had not been entered into intelligently and
knowingly, and that the defendant should have had an opportunity to
quasi-guardian as well as an advocate. 28 Although the client may be
incapacitated, an attorney still has a responsibility to consider his wishes.
As the comment to Model Rule 1.14 states: "[A] client lacking legal
competence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and
reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being..
.-29 While counsel must take into consideration the wishes of his
partially incapacitated client, he must not stray from his ultimate duty to
act in the best interests of his client.
Finally, one of the most important lessons anyone acquainted with
Moran must take away with them is the importance of discouraging pleas
of guilty to capital murder unless a sentence other than death is assured.
30
The appellate process as it now stands often will make such decisions
irrevocable. Moran is a clear example of how the true contentions of a
defendant may be distorted in the appellate process. A defendant like
Moran who emerges from a drug induced haze, may not be given the
opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Summary and analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 495, 281 S.E.2d at 878.
For other Virginia decisions applying Boykin, see, e.g., Burton v.
Peyton, 210 Va. 484, 489, 171 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1970)(upholding
validity of guilty plea based on Boykin); Miracle v. Peyton, 211 Va. 123,
126, 176 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1970)(same); Anderson v. Warden, 222 Va.
511,515,281 S.E.2d 885,888 (1981)(noting inter alia that the "purpose
of the [Boykin] examination on the record is to forestall 'the spin-off of
collateral proceedings'... ." (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244)).
27 Model Code of Professional Responsibility E.C. 7-12.
28 See Henderson, Presenting Mitigation Against the Client's
Wishes: A Moral or Professional Imperative?, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
29 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14, cmt. 1.
30 See Commonwealth v. Dubois, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993), and
case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
JOHNSON v. TEXAS
113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On March 23, 1986, nineteen year-old Dorsie Lee Johnson and a
friend, Amanda Miles, robbed a convenience store in Snyder, Texas.
Johnson shot and killed the clerk, Jack Huddleston. A few weeks after
the crime, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted
murder of a store clerk in Colorado City, Texas. At that time, Johnson
confessed to Jack Huddleston's murder and the robbery in Snyder. The
homicide qualified as a capital offense underTexas law becauseJohnson
intentionally or knowingly caused the clerk's death and the murder
occurred in the commission of a robbery.
1
I Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.02(a)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1989).
See case summary of Graham v. Collins, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5,
No. 2, p. 8 (1993). Cf. Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(4).
2 At the time of Johnson's trial, the Texas capital-sentencing statute
contained two "special issues" for the jury to consider:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
During the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial, the State pre-
sented a variety of evidence to establish future dangerousness, cover-
ing a time period from an incident in the third grade when Johnson
stabbed a classmate with a pencil, to six days after Huddleston's
murder when Johnson fired two shots at a man outside a Snyder
restaurant, and culminating with testimony from a sheriff's deputy in
a jail where Johnson was being held, stating that Johnson had threat-
ened to "get" the deputy when he was released. In contrast, the sole
witness in mitigation for the defense was Johnson's father, who
testified that an eighteen or nineteen year-old does not fully evaluate
his conduct in the same way as an olderperson. Johnson was sentenced
to death.2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
3
of the deceased was committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result; (2) whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the
